[quote name=\'Loogaroo\' post=\'229602\' date=\'Nov 1 2009, 06:18 AM\']I've always thought that the best way to defuse the whole "screwing over with no retribution" aspect of the prisoner's dilemma is to add a third option, one that guarantees a small portion of the pot to you regardless of what the other player chooses, and causes the other player to get nothing if he does attempt to hose you. Split-Split, Split-Steal and Steal-Steal have the same outcomes, but the third option (let's call it "Secure") awards the player 10% of the pot no matter what. If both pick Secure, they each get 10%; if it's Secure-Split, the Splitter gets half as normal, and if it's Secure-Steal, the Stealer leaves with nothing but bad karma.[/quote]
So exactly one of the three possible Steal scenarios gets the Stealer a thin dime, thus reducing the interest in Stealing a great deal. And committing to picking Steal is now condemning the other guy to winning at most 10%. That doesn't fix the problem.
The problem that still exists (and the problem the Prisoner's Dilemma will ALWAYS have by its very nature) is that the outcome that creates a Grand Prize winner is also the one that ends the show on a complete downer, 'cuz the other guy got farked for trying to be a good guy. And that the only ending that ISN'T a downer is a Split/Split, which nobody cares about. (And in your example, Secure/Split still ends with "Aw, you could have made more money if you'd trusted him!")
(And it's never the optimal play anyhow. If one guy says "I'm going to Steal!" the optimal response is to Secure. If he says "I'm going to Secure!", the optimal response is to Split, and he says "I'm going to Split!" the optimal response is to Steal. When the outcome that creates the happiest ending is also the poorest play strategically for both players, that's a fundamental problem.)
Some people, as we've seen above, apparently like watching someone get farked for trying to do the right thing, but I think those people are far and away in the minority.
